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CONTENTS
• Economic expansion in Euroland has decelerated
considerably after mid-2000 as a consequence of
the weakening of growth in the world economy,
the tightening of monetary policy by the European
Central Bank as well as the burden imposed by
higher oil prices. While the upswing in the euro
area has come to an end, there is no reason to
dramatize the current situation. It has to be kept in
mind that economy-wide capacity utilization has
already risen to its normal level, and it is not likely
that real GDP will fall below potential output.
• The government budget of euro-area countries
showed a surplus in 2000 for the first time since
the 1960s. This year and next year the euro-area
budget will change into a deficit also because
taxes had been cut in a number of countries. It has
to be criticized that consolidation efforts have
ceased; in particular Germany, France, and Italy
are still far away from a balanced budget. There is
a risk that these countries will not meet their
targets; the stability and growth programs are
somewhat unrealistic because governments expect
that higher trend growth than in the past will solve
the problem.
• Many observers have urged the ECB to follow the
example of the Fed and cut interest rates in order
to prevent a sharp drop in economic activity. But
in our view the ECB neither should nor will
alter its course. First of all the current stance of
monetary policy is not restrictive; according to the
Taylor rule, short-term interest rates are even too
low. Moreover, the growth of M3 will not fall
below the reference value. Finally, the projections
presented by the ECB last December do not justify
a cut in interest rates.
In the medium run, the expansion of the money
stock is the most important factor for inflation,
while in the short run inflation is also influenced
by other factors. These considerations underlie the
P-star model in which the development of infla-
tion depends on the liquidity overhang, defined as
price gap, as well as on cost factors. This model
can explain the past movements of inflation quite
well. As regards the inflation forecast it is impor-
tant to note that the price gap has closed due to a
rise in the price level and the slower increase in
M3 in the past months. Consequently, we expect
that the increase in consumer prices will gradually
slow in 2001 and 2002.
Recently, the Irish government has been criticized
by the Council of European finance ministers for
its fiscal policy. This came as a surprise in view
of the excellent situation of public finances in
Ireland. The critique aimed at the loosening of
fiscal policy which would aggravate the bottle-
necks in the economy. But it is also questionable
whether a fiscal contraction in Ireland would be
the appropriate response. All in all, the only way
to cool down the economy seems to be an acceler-
ation of wage growth and inflation and the implied
real appreciation of the Irish pound.
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Economic expansion in Euroland has decelerated considerably. Since mid-2000 real GDP has increased
at an annualized rate of only 2.5 percent after 3.5 percent in the previous four quarters. The reduction in
dynamics is due to the weakening of growth in the world economy, the tightening of monetary policy by
the European Central Bank (ECB) as well as the burden imposed by higher oil prices.
The upswing in the euro area has thus come to an end. Against this background several observers have
demanded a rapid loosening of monetary policy. However, there is no reason to dramatize the current
situation. It has to be kept in mind that in the meantime overall capacity utilization has risen to its normal
level. Thus it was correct to raise interest rates and to stop the monetary stimulus for demand in order to
avoid a sharper turnaround of monetary policy at a later point in time. The monetary tightening does not
imply that real GDP will fall below potential output. Also, the lower demand growth from abroad is just
a normalization rather than a cause for alarm: An increase of world production of nearly 5 percent as
observed last year is not sustainable, and also it could not be expected that the US economy would grow
by 4 percent or more per year for an extended period of time. In addition,.the lower value of the euro
could not raise the growth of exports for a long time even if it had remained at its low level. In addition,
the situation on world markets for raw materials has calmed down in the meantime so that the
dampening effects of the oil price shock will slowly fade. Finally, there is a positive impulse for the
economy in the current year due to tax cuts in several countries.
It is likely that economic expansion this year and next year will reach a rate which is in line with
the growth rate of potential output; just as most institutions we estimate this rate to be 2.5 percent.
Unemployment will decline further, and inflation will gradually decline.
For this forecast there are risks which most of all refer to the outlook for the United States. Should
there be a recession, the economy in the euro area would also be dampened for a while; however, even
then a severe slowdown is not likely. On the other hand, it may also be the case that the fundamental
strength of the US economy is greater than currently perceived by many observers, and the turnaround
would be more pronounced than currently anticipated.
Many economists find disappointing that the growth rate of potential output in the euro area is—as
most estimates suggest—just 2.5 percent. However, this rate has nothing to do with monetary policy.
The central bank cannot "stimulate" potential output, rather there is a broad consensus about the long-
i#n neutrality of money. The production potential of an economy is determined by the use of the pro-
duction factors, technological progress as well as the institutional framework; monetary policy has no
influence on these supply conditions of an economy.
1 Cooling Down of Economic Activity
Production in the euro area moved onto the path of potential output in the course of last year. With
that a long period of underutilized capacities in the economy came to an end.
1 However there are con-
siderable divergences between the cyclical positions of the individual countries: While some econ-
omies, as the Italian, still have not reached normal capacity utilization, others experience a boom.
This is especially true for Ireland where the output gap has reached more than 5 percent which points
at an acceleration of inflation in the near future. It is questionable whether economic policy can bring
about the necessary cooling down of the Irish economy. Obviously monetary policy as a stabilizing
instrument is not available to individual countries in the euro area anymore. In the end economic
expansion in Ireland will only calm if wage increases accelerate and international competitiveness
diminishes (Box 1).
According to OECD estimates the output gap which had opened up in the course of the 1993 recession in Euroland
remained negative until about mid-2000.Box 1: Overheating in Ireland: What Can Be Done?
The economic performance of the Irish economy during the past six years is impressive. Between 1994 and 2000, real GDP increased
by almost 10 percent per year on average (1988 to 1994: 4.7 percent). The following factors have decisively contributed to this success
story (Fitz Gerald 2000): First, Ireland has benefited from a considerable inflow of foreign direct investment and the related knowledge
transfer. Second, transfers from the EU budget, which amounted to up to 4 percent of GDP, made possible the financing of important
infrastructure projects. Moreover, wage moderation has been particularly pronounced in international comparison since 1987 in the
wake of the cooperation between the government, the unions and employers (see chapter "Labor market"). The moderate wage devel-
opment was favored by immigration and the excess supply of labor—as recently asi 1995 the unemployment rate in Ireland amounted to
more than 12 percent (2000: 4.5 percent). Finally, fiscal policy, with its course of consolidation since 1987, has led to a sustained in-
crease in the confidence of the private sector and of international investors: The debt to GDP ratio has fallen from more than 110 per-
cent to less than 40 percent, and the government spending as well as the revenue ratio have decreased by 20 and 7 percentage points,
respectively. While the Irish government recorded a budget deficit of more than 8 percent in relation to GDP in 1987, it achieved a
budget surplus of almost 5 percent last year.
Against this background it may have come as a surprise that the Irish government has recently been criticized by the Council of
European finance ministers for its fiscal policy. After all, Ireland fully complies with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact.
However, the critique did not aim at the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy, but at its short-run design. The updated Stability and
Growth Program of Ireland provides for substantial tax cuts and expenditure increases this year and next year. These measures would
aggravate the bottlenecks in the Irish economy. Admittedly, the main reason for overheating lies in extremely loose monetary con-
ditions. The figure shows that the short-run nominal interest rate is far below the appropriate level according to the Taylor rule.
a But
the European Central Bank with its orientation towards the euro-area average cannot bring about the necessary cooling down of the
Irish economy. If the ECB raised its key interest rate to the extent appropriate for Ireland, it would trigger a recession in the rest of the
euro area. Moreover, the nominal exchange rate is not available anymore as an automatic stabilizer since the beginning of monetary
union. Rather, the pronounced weakness of the euro has additionally stimulated the Irish economy in the last two years.
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In this situation, fiscal policy is supposedly the only instrument that can be used in order to dampen economic activity. While most
observers agree that fiscal policy should follow a restrictive course
b, it is questionable whether a fiscal contraction in Ireland can really
bring about the desired slowdown. Public expenditures have already reached a low level in relation to GDP—the lowest in Euroland;
thus, the room for reductions in this area is limited. Moreover, investment in infrastructure can reduce supply bottlenecks in the
medium run. Strong tax increases would be difficult to carry through politically in the light of large budget surpluses.
0 It is thus
improbable that a fiscal contraction to the extent that would be necessary to close the output gap will be undertaken. It is also doubtful
whether a restrictive fiscal policy would be sufficient in order to dampen total demand. The figure shows that fiscal consolidation in
the past years, measured in terms of the change in the structural budget balance, has not been able to prevent the overheating of the
Irish economy. Rather it is conceivable with regard to the Ricardian equivalence proposition that the private sector reduces its savings
to the extent that the government increases the budget surplus. This scenario seems to be realistic at present: In view of prosperous
public finances the Irish government would probably only be able to carry through a temporary contraction. The private sector would
react to that by increasing its demand—anticipating tax cuts in the future.
In the end the key to a cooling down of the economy lies in a significant acceleration of wage rates and inflation and the implied real
appreciation of the Irish pound.
d The cooperation between the government and the social partners should be used in order to prevent an
overshooting in the wage adjustment process.
e
aThe coefficients included in the Taylor rule (of the constant, of the output gap and of the price gap) were estimated with the help of a
single-equation regression. —
 bSee O'Rourke and Thorn (2000) for a dissenting view. These authors argue that there was no
alternative to the announced tax cuts. In their view the tax cuts were necessary in order to preserve the social partnership and thus wage
moderation. However, in any case wages will have to increase faster than (nominal) productivity in the near future. The Irish economy
has reached full employment by now. If wage moderation is continued, an excess demand on the labor market will soon arise. This
excess demand can only be eliminated by a strong increase in wages. —
 cThe agreement between the government and the social
partners that has supported the dynamics of the Irish economy in the past now has become an obstacle to necessary tax increases (Lane
1998). In these agreements the government promised the unions to cut taxes in exchange for wage moderation. At present, unions
expect further tax cuts of the government. —
 dSee also Fitz Gerald (2001) and Blanchard (2001). —
 eSee also Honohan (2000).After a very strong expansion until summer 2000, economic activity has slowed down perceptibly
(Figure 1). In the second half of last year, real GDP rose at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, a rate that is
only slightly higher than potential output growth. The slower speed of expansion was above all due to
a weaker increase in domestic demand as a result of monetary tightening and the strong rise in oil
prices. Private consumption was especially dampened in the third quarter of last year when the losses
in real income resulting from the oil price surge culminated. In the last quarter of 2000 private
consumption strongly recovered, not only because of falling oil prices but also in reaction to tax
measures in some countries. Italy introduced income tax cuts in November, and in the Netherlands
purchases were brought forward because indirect taxes were considerably increased at the beginning
of 2001. Gross fixed capital formation decelerated only slightly in the course of last year. Admittedly
financing conditions deteriorated in the wake of monetary tightening and moreover sales and profit
expectations are less optimistic than in mid-2000. At the same time, however, according to surveys of
the European Commission capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector is substantially above its
long-term average.
The export sector of the euro area was able to expand its sales to third countries by a double-digit
figure in real terms last year. This performance can be partly attributed to the prosperous economic
situation in the most important sales markets. Especially the deliveries to the United Kingdom, to
Central and Eastern Europe and to Southeast Asia increased strongly. However, exports to the United
States, which had expanded particularly lively until last spring, showed signs of deceleration in the
second half of 2000. Notwithstanding,\external demand remained strong until the end of last year due
to continued impulses from the depreciation of the euro. Even though the real effective exchange rate
of the euro has risen since October, it still was 5.6 percent lower at the end of 2000 than one year
before.
Consumer price inflation has remained high until recently. In January 2001, the Harmonized Index
of Consumer Prices (HICP) was 2.4 percent higher than one year before. The inflation rate has ex-
ceeded the upper bound that the ECB is willing to tolerate in the medium run for more than a year.
Admittedly the largest part of the acceleration in inflation is due to the rapid rise in energy prices—a
barrel crude oil cost 40 percent more on a euro basis in 2000 than the year before. But in the mean-
time the underlying price trend (the core inflation, i.e. without energy, food, alcohol and tobacco
prices) has also crept up. On the one hand companies in the euro area have increasingly exhausted the
scope for raising prices arising from the strong economic expansion. On the other hand the rise in core
inflation can be traced back to the indirect effects of the increase in energy prices. The past months
witnessed a strong rise in the consumer goods component of the industrial price index. This com-
ponent usually reacts with some delay to changes in the prices of imported intermediate goods. How-
ever, there is little evidence for second-round effects so far as wage increases in the euro area have
remained moderate.
2 Fiscal Policy: Large Countries End Their Consolidation Efforts
The combined budget of euro-area countries showed a surplus in 2000 for the first time since the
1960s; in relation to GDP it amounted to 0.3 percent after a deficit of 1.3 percent the year before
(Table 1). The debt-GDP ratio fell to 68.5 percent last year and thus came closer to the reference
value laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. However, the increase in the budget balance suggests a size
of consolidation that was not really achieved. The improvement in public finances is above all due to
one-off revenues. Some countries obtained receipts from the allocation of mobile phone licenses
(UMTS), which amount to around 1 percent of GDP for the euro area as a whole. Moreover, the high
speed of economic expansion brought about that tax revenues were pouring in and that expenditure
related to unemployment could be reduced. If one corrects the budget balance for these effects, it can
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Source: ECB (2001); own calculations and forecasts.
As the concerned governments have not yet planned any consolidation measures we expect that the
euro area as a whole will once more record a considerable budget deficit this year and next in spite of
a continued increase in production. On the one hand the receipts from the allocation of mobile phone
licenses will be considerably lower this year and vanish in 2002. On the other hand the budget
position in Euroland deteriorates because several countries have—in some cases drastically—cut
direct taxes at the beginning of this year. We estimate that the tax cuts amount to around 1 percent in
relation to GDP. This is not compensated by equivalent expenditure reductions or extra revenues due
to economic trends. All in all the consolidated budget of the euro area will exhibit a deficit of 0.8
percent in relation to GDP this year. In 2002 it will reach a comparable order of magnitude.
It has to be criticized that consolidation efforts have ceased, asthe majority of countries still do not
meet the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact in spite of favorable economic conditions. The
Pact demands that euro-area countries should exhibit a balanced budget on average over the business
cycle. Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Portugal are still away from this target. While the two last-
mentioned countries took measures in order to reduce the deficit at the beginning of the year the three
largest economies of the euro area have cut taxes considerably without proceeding to corresponding
expenditure reductions. Admittedly tax cuts are welcome under efficiency considerations in those
countries with a high tax burden. But they should be accompanied by expenditure restraints in order
to be sustainable in the long run.
In the updated stability and growth programs governments in these countries seem to mainly rely on
higher trend growth than in the past, and expect that this will be sufficient to eliminate budget deficits
(Table 2). The growth assumption is particularly optimistic in the case of Italy. The GDP growth rate
of 3.1 percent assumed for the years 2001 until 2004 has not been reached let alone exceeded in a
single year since the late 1980s. In order to be able to stay below the deficit ratio of 3 percent even in
the case of a recession the governments of the large countries should intensify their efforts and try to
approach the target of a balanced budget more rapidly by recurring to expenditure restraint. This
target has been attacked by many observers in the past. Without the instrument of deficit finance—say
the critics—necessary public investment would not be undertaken. However, the proponents of this
view overlook that achieving the target of a balanced budget in the medium run laid down in the
Stability and Growth Pact does not imply that government investment has to be curtailed. Rather the
Pact as well as the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the European Union intend that the































































































































aSome Stability and Growth Programs include alternative scenarios concerning GDP growth. This
—
 bAverage annual growth rate. —
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table reflects the basic scenario.
the Stability and Growth Programs, partly
corrected for differences in definitions. —
 eFigures for 2000 are taken from the Stability and Growth Programs. Receipts from the
allocation of UMTS licenses
countries above.
are not included. — 'Projection until 2003 only. — ^Central government. — "Average for the
Source: OECD (2000); Stability and Growth Programs; own calculations and estimates.
3 Monetary Policy: The ECB Should Not Cut Interest Rates
Since October last year, the ECB has left key interest rates unchanged. The minimum bid rate on the
main refinancing operations in the euro area has remained at 4.75 percent. The 3-month money market
rate was at roughly the same level in early March (Figure 2). The previous rate hikes by the central
bank have contributed to the deceleration of monetary expansion. The annual rate of change of M3
declined to some 4 percent in the three months until January 2001, compared to more than 5 percent
in the preceding three-month period. Long-term interest rates continued to decline. In early March
they amounted to 5 percent and were about half a percentage point lower than six months before; in
real terms, bond yields are considerably below their long-term average. The euro has recovered
somewhat from its low in October last year; it has gained ground especially against the US dollar and
the Japanese yen. In real effective terms it increased by about 7 percent from October until February.
3.1 Interest Rate Policy Is Not Restrictive
The impact of monetary policy on economic activity can best be described in terms of the level and
the development of the short-term interest rate, and here it is appropriate to focus on the real rate. If
the real rate is approximated by the difference between the nominal rate (3-month money market rate)
and the current rate of inflation (year-over-year increase in the HICP), it can be said that the increase
in interest rates by the ECB since November 1999 points at a tightening of monetary policy: Since
then, the nominal interest rate rose by a little more than two percentage points, whereas inflation rose
by a little more than one percentage point. However, since last fall, the real rate has—contrary to
expectations—not increased but actually decreased slightly. Therefore, the stance of monetary policy
has been more expansionary than we had assumed earlier (Gern et al. 2000: 9). In the first quarter of
2001, the calculated real interest rate amounted to approximately a little more than 2 percent. If the
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The question whether monetary policy is neutral or even restrictive depends on the level of the
neutral (or equilibrium) real interest rate which also plays an important role in the Taylor rule.10
However, this rate cannot be observed directly, and it can be estimated only with uncertainty.?-
3This
is especially true for the euro area because the monetary union has existed only for two years and
includes countries which previously had different regimes of monetary policy; one could observe that
there were large differences in terms of real interest rates in the countries due to, for example, un-
certainties concerning devaluation. Therefore, it seems appropriate to use the real rate in that country
as a benchmark which was not subject to such special factors. It has become a common procedure to
take the rate prevailing in Germany as a reference; in other countries of the euro area, the real interest
rate over a longer period had been up to three percentage points higher than in Germany (Boss et al.
1999:52).
As the real rate appears to fluctuate substantially over time (Scheide 1998: 10), the period chosen
for averaging is important for the estimate. It seems appropriate to consider a full cycle as it can be
assumed then that monetary policy is (at least, approximately) neutral. The period should not be much
longer because the real rate is obviously not constant over, say, decades.
4 In Germany, the recent full
business cycle can be dated between 1988 and 1998; in this period, the average short-term real inter-
est rate was 3.4 percent.
5 However, one could argue that this value is biased upwards because of a
special situation; in fact, the boom following German unification in the early 1990s has probably led
to unusually high interest rates. For a shorter period, namely 1992-1998, the average amounts to 2.6
percent. This value may, however, be biased downwards as the period does not cover a full cycle and
as monetary policy may not have been neutral but expansionary on average. On the basis of all these
considerations, it seems reasonable to assume that the neutral real rate for the euro area is about 3 per-
cent.
In order to judge the current stance of monetary policy with the real rate of interest, it is probably
not useful to refer to single monthly observations as they are subject to large fluctuations; consequent-
ly, the judgment of the policy stance would change quite often. During the first quarter of 2001, the
real interest rate amounts to little more than 2 percent. Although it will probably increase in the
future—assuming unchanged nominal rates—because of the expected decline of inflation, it will not
rise above 3 percent in the forecast horizon. Accordingly, monetary policy will not be restrictive in
terms of its effects on economic activity.
3.2 The ECB Will Leave Key Rates Unchanged
The ECB has been urged by many observers to quickly lower interest rates; following the example of
the US central bank, the ECB should act against an otherwise unavoidable downturn of the economy
in the euro area. However, we expect that the ECB will not change its course for several reasons. The
current stance of monetary policy is, as is described above, not restrictive at all. According to the
often propagated Taylor rule, interest rates are even too low. Based on the fact that the output gap,
estimated by the OECD, has recently closed, the Taylor interest rate depends only on the current
According to the neoclassical growth theory, the real interest rate should be equal to the growth rate of potential output
of an economy. However, this conclusion conflicts with actual observations which reveal substantial differences at
several times.
Taylor (1993: 202) assumes a steady-state growth rate of 2 percent for the United States. He sticks to this number in a
later publication (Taylor 1999) although the growth rates in the decades he analyzes vary considerably; other authors
also work on the assumption of a 2' percent rate (McCallum 2000). In contrast, Hetzel (2000: 18) points out that the
observed real rate of interest is often much higher than 2 percent and the same applies to the growth rate of potential
output.
If only the most recent value were of interest, one could also use time series approaches which allow for a variable trend
such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter. While these methods may be closer to the current values, there is the risk that the
estimate for the current period is biased if monetary policy has not been neutral at the end of the estimation period.
The time period chosen seems appropriate because the output gap was roughly the same in both 1988 and 1998
according to estimates of the OECD (2000). If the previous cycle is included, the average real interest rate is somewhat
higher.11
inflation rate and the deviation of inflation from the target (which can be taken as 1.5 percent).
According to the Taylor rule, the central bank should raise the real interest rate above the equilibrium
level if inflation is above the target. This is also the outcome of most macroeconomic models (e.g.
Clarida et al. 1999: 1674). With an inflation rate of 2.5 percent in the first quarter of this year and a
neutral real rate of 3 percent, the nominal interest rate which is compatible with macroeconomic
stability amounts to 6 percent; if the real equilibrium rate is assumed to be only 2.5 percent, the rate is
also half a percentage point lower (Figure 3). Assuming that inflation will decelerate somewhat in the
near future, the Taylor interest rate will decline, too, but it will still be above the current nominal rate.
The current interest rate of 4.7 percent can be considered appropriate only if the core rate of inflation,
which is slightly lower than 2 percent, is used for the calculation.
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Alternative assumptions on the equilibrium real interest rate (3% or 2.5 %).
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Also, the two pillars of the monetary policy strategy do not suggest that interest rates should be cut.
While the growth of M3 has come closer to the reference value, there is currently no risk of an
undershooting. As far as the second pillar is concerned, the ECB has recently published projections
for inflation and other key variables (Box 2); they, too, cannot be used to justify interest rate cuts.
Until the end of 2002, the ECB expects real GDP to increase by about 3 percent per year if interest
rates remain constant.
6 As the ECB still assumes potential output to grow by 2 to 2.5 percent a year,
this forecast implies a cumulated increase of the output gap by 1.5 percent; this would actually call for
a rise of key rates for cyclical reasons. In addition, inflation is supposed to remain close to the upper
limit of tolerated inflation so that a loosening of policy cannot be justified on the basis of the second
pillar. To be sure, it is likely that the ECB does not anymore expect economic activity to increase as
much as expected in the projection published last December. But this could only justify that the
otherwise necessary rate hike will not be made. More importantly, it is likely that the inflation
forecast will, if anything, be raised rather than lowered. In the past months, there have been several
The numbers include a range which reflects the uncertainty of the forecasts. For both inflation and GDP growth, the
average forecast error amounts to ± 0.5 percentage points. For nominal GDP the ECB estimates a very high growth rate;
if it is assumed that M3 rises as fast as implied by the reference value of 4.5 percent, the velocity of money would
increase by about 0.5 percent. This is quite unusual if compared to the past and would be compatible only with higher
interest rates. According to our forecast, velocity will decline by about 0.5 percent per year in 2001 and 2002, which is
much more in line with past experience.12
Box 2: Publication of the Inflation Forecast
The European Central Bank published its inflation forecast for the first time last December (ECB 2000); this is a new
step as far as the communication with the public is concerned. With this publication the central bank has made the
second pillar of its monetary policy strategy more precise, whereas previously the inflation perspectives were only more
or less vaguely described but not put in concrete numbers. This had quite often let to irritations in the public because the
weights of the different factors affecting inflation were not always clear. Also, the importance of the various indicators
seemed to change.
The projection on the basis of constant interest rates is in line with the procedure of those central banks that pursue a
strategy of inflation targeting; among these is, for example, the Bank of England. The idea of the publication is that
monetary policy becomes more transparent and is also better controlled by the public. This does not mean, however, that
the central bank has to follow such forecasts in a mechanical way when deciding about key interest rates; this is also not
true in the framework of inflation targeting. But the central bank is under pressure to explain its behavior if, for example,
interest rates are not raised in spite of a forecast overshooting of the inflation target. In this way, the publication leads to
more discipline of monetary policy which is desirable in the context of a rule-like policy. With such an instrument
credibility may be enhanced, so that the risk premium and thus the real interest rate decline. The publication of forecasts
may also be helpful for those central banks who had allowed too much inflation in the past (which is true for most of the
central banks now pursuing the strategy of inflation targeting and which was also the explicit reason for the shift to the
new strategy), and also for a "young" central bank like the ECB which may not yet have the desired reputation.
Whether this new instrument of the ECB will have the desired consequences remains to be seen in the future when
monetary policy decisions are made. At present, it is not quite clear what the role of the inflation forecast for interest rate
policy is, if and how much the ECB will refer to these forecasts. So far the ECB has tried to play down the importance of
the projections somewhat by stressing that these are only one of the many information monetary policy will use.
However, this would weaken this instrument because the projections are nothing less but the second pillar of the
monetary policy strategy. Every policy decision in the future will therefore have to refer to the projections, and it will
have to be explained how the level of interest rates will help to achieve the inflation target. It may be useful for the ECB
to avoid the impression that it is locked in for too long because of the published projection or that it will have to do
more explanation if it does not act according to it. As the forecasts may have to be revised quite quickly because
conditions—as the present situation shows -, may rapidly change, it would be desirable if the forecasts were published
four times a year instead of only twice a year as it is planned now.
negative surprises regarding actual inflation, a fact that cannot be solely explained by the unexpected
rise of oil prices: Although oil prices have recently declined, inflation at the beginning of this year
remained higher than was anticipated by most observers and also by leading representatives of the
ECB. If in a situation of unexpectedly high inflation—which is, in addition, higher than the target—a
central bank lowers interest rates it will run the risk of losing credibility.
For all these reasons we do not expect that the ECB will loosen its policy. There is no reason that
the central bank should now stimulate the economy. It is true that economic expansion in the euro
area has lost momentum. However, according to our forecast capacity utilization will remain at its
normal level in 2001 as well as in 2002. This would be the ideal path for economic activity as it could
continue without any major tensions. As far as inflation is concerned, there is not yet any reason to be
less cautious. While headline inflation is likely to decline, it will take some time untilit returns into
the target range or, respectively, stays sufficiently below the upper bound of 2 percent.
3.3 Monetary Conditions Are More or Less Neutral
Given unchanged key interest rates, it is likely that the money stock will rise at a rate which is
compatible with price stability. According to the McCallum Rule this implies that M3 can increase by
about 5 percent per year (Figure 4). Consequently, there will be no further pressure on future inflation
as far as the effects of monetary policy are concerned.
We furthermore expect the euro to strengthen against the dollar in the forecast horizon, the most
important reason being that the Fed has already lowered interest rates and is likely to lower them
further this year. Thus, the difference between real interest rates changes in favor of the European
currency. According to the exchange rate model that we use (Gern et al. 2000: 13ff.), the euro will13
Figure 4: Expansion of M3 in Euroland
a: Actual Values and Values According to McCallum Rule
Percent Percent
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aYear-over-year increase of M3. Forecast starting in 20011.
Source: ECB (2001); own calculations.
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exceed the parity vis-a-vis the dollar at the end of this year. The real effective exchange rate of the
euro will therefore rise considerably. Long-term interest rates will probably remain low for some
time, also due to the only moderate growth of the world economy, and thus help to stabilize economic
activity. All in all, monetary conditions in the euro area will be roughly neutral in the forecast period.
3.4 Money Growth: Inflation Will Gradually Decline
The expansion of the money stock is the most important factor for inflation in the medium term. This
is also assumed by the ECB as M3 plays a prominent role in the monetary policy strategy. In the short
run, inflation is also affected by a number of other variables, especially cost factors. This has recently
been the case as oil prices pushed inflation up. Anyway, even in the short term money plays a role; in
fact, inflation today would be lower if in the past two years M3 had risen by 4.5 percent as planned
instead of the actual rate of 5.5 percent.
Such considerations are the basis of the so-called P-Star model in which inflation over time is
explained by a liquidity overhang—defined in the model as the price gap
7—and by cost factors. This
approach implies that in the long run, the price level is determined by the level of the money stock
alone, whereas in the short run, there is no immediate adjustment of prices to changes in money. The
attractive feature of this model is that it is compatible with almost all macroeconomic theories: On the
one hand, there is the assumption of a certain rigidity of prices, on the other hand, the long-run
neutrality of money holds.
The price gap is the difference between the equilibrium price level, which is determined by the money stock, and the
actual price level. A positive price gap leads (ceteris paribus) to an acceleration of inflation. This approach is described
by Hallman et al. (1991); for an application of this approach to analyze inflation in Germany see Kramer and Scheide
(1994).14
Estimating a P-Star model makes only sense if both the trend of output as well as the trend of
velocity can be estimated with some confidence. This seems to be the case for the euro area as there is
not much of a difference as far as potential output is concerned; and the velocity of money has
behaved remarkably stable in recent years as it followed closely the trend observed in the 1990s
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft 2000: 44). The estimated model can explain the behavior of inflation in the past
20 years quite well (Box 3). This includes also the recent pickup of inflation which was in part due to
the rise of the oil price and the fall of the euro. But it was also important that money growth
accelerated in 1999 and 2000, which implied that the price gap became positive.
For the inflation forecast it is important to note that the price gap has closed in the meantime: First
of all, the price level has risen considerably, and second, money growth has slowed down recently.
The other factors (excluding unit labor costs) work in the direction of a slowdown of inflation in the
future, too. We expect therefore that the increase in the HICP will gradually decline. The rate of
inflation is likely to amount to 2.3 percent and 1.8 percent in 2001 and 2002, respectively.
Box 3: A P-Star Model for Euroland
The quarterly inflation rate (Ap)—defined as the current change in the HICP—is influenced by a number of factors.
Apart from the lagged endogenous variable the estimate is based on the price gap (pgap) and the quarterly rates of
change in the oil price (petrolp), other raw material prices (rawp), unit labor costs {ulc) and the effective exchange rate
of the euro (exch):
a
[1] Ap, = 0.0014+ 0.544p,_3 + 0.19 Ap,_5 + 0.18 pgap,^ + 0.0043 Apetrolp,-X + 0.016 Arawp,^ + 0.009 Arawp,_6 ^ (4.37) (8.14)
 y





The price gap which is determined by the trend of velocity, the growth rate of potential output and by the money
stock, has a relatively large impact on the inflation rate in the following period: If M3 increases by 1 percent, the rate of
inflation rises (ceteris paribus) by 0.2 percentage points. While the other variables only have a transitory impact on in-
flation—just as the quantity theory suggests -, a permanent change in the money stock leads to a permanent change in
the price level, in other words: the neutrality of money holds according to the equation. A dynamic simulation for the
estimation period 1980.4-2000.3 shows that the movements of inflation can be described quite well by the equation
(Figure).
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aIn addition, a dummy is included for the period 1992.3-1994.3 in which there was an irregular movement of velocity.
For a detailed description of the approach see Scheide and Trabandt (2000).15
4 Labor Market: Benefits of Wage Moderation
The labor market evolved particularly favorably last year against the background of the strong up-
swing. The number of employed persons increased by more than 2 percent according to ECB
estimates and in January 2001 the unemployment rate (8.6 percent in ILO definition) reached its
lowest level since fall 1991. Since the end of 1997 the unemployment rate has continuously declined
by 3 percentage points. Wage moderation has decisively contributed to this positive development.
Recently Blanchard (2000) has provided simple calculations in order to explain employment
dynamics in Ireland and the Netherlands. In the following, his approach will be applied to the euro-
area labor market. The starting point of his analysis is the neoclassical growth theory: In the steady
state the growth rate of real wages must equal the rate of technological progress.
8 If the increase in
real wages exceeds the increase in labor productivity, companies will augment the share of capital in
relation to labor in their production. Figure 5 shows this relationship for Euroland for the years 1972-
2000.
9 hi the 1970s employment hardly increased; at the same time wage agreements considerably
exceeded the increase in productivity. In the 1980s a period of wage moderation coincided with
remarkable gains in employment. At the beginning of the 1990s the relationship between these two
magnitudes seems to vanish. This can be traced back to the times of German unification when the
number of employed persons in Germany jumped above all due to the larger territory. During the uni-
fication boom wage moderation was abandoned, a development which may be partly responsible for
the subsequent loss in employment. Since 1994 employment and wage moderation have moved to-
gether again.
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In the case of Ireland the parallel movement between wage moderation and employment is even
more impressive. There, wage moderation was much more pronounced in the 1990s than in the euro
This refers to the kind of technological progress labeled labor-augmenting or Harrod-neutral in the literature. With this
kind of technological progress the capital coefficient as well as the income distribution are constant in the steady state.
The variable "wage moderation" is defined as the difference between the logarithmic values of the productivity index
and the actual real wage in the private sector. An increase in a given year means that the rise in real wages stays behind
the increase in productivity implying a positive impulse for employment. The variable "employment" corresponds to the
logarithmic value of employed persons. Both variables were normalized to zero at the beginning of the sample period.
As no capital stock data are available for the euro area the calculation of the variables deviates from the procedure of
Blanchard (2000). ,16
area. At the same time Ireland exhibited the strongest gains in employment among euro-area coun-
tries. Figure 5 also shows that since 1998 employment has increased much more rapidly than the
measure of wage moderation would indicate on its own. This finding corresponds to the evidence
reported in Box 1. In the past three years the Irish economy—stimulated by an expansionary monetary
policy and by an undervalued currency—has expanded at a pace much faster than is sustainable in the
long run. The symptoms of an economic overheating in Ireland can be recognized on the labor market,
too.
The wage increase in the euro area will accelerate in the course of this year and in the coming year;
nevertheless we expect that real wage increases will be roughly in line with the productivity trend.
Thus, no further positive impulse for employment will come from wage setting. In connection with
the slowdown in economic activity this will lead to a perceptibly slower employment growth. The un-
employment rate will average 8.3 percent this year, hi the course of next year unemployment will
hardly go down anymore; we expect that the unemployment rate will average 8 percent in 2002.
5 Outlook: GDP Grows in Line with Potential Output
At present the leading indicators show an ambiguous picture of the short-term perspectives of the
European economy. The sentiment indicators compiled by the European Commission point to a
continuation of economic expansion at a rapid pace. Consumer confidence has increased recently after
having gone down markedly in the wake of the oil price surge. The recent embellishment is probably
due to the tax relieves that have come into force in several countries at the beginning of the year.
Moreover confidence in the industrial sector, which slightly decreased in the last months, is still high
in comparison with its historical average. However a lot of other leading indicators signal an
economic slowdown in the coming months. The European purchasing manager index has significantly
dropped following the downturn in the United States. Also the growth indicator calculated by
Euroframe
1
0 shows that economic activity will lose some more momentum in the first half of 2001.
All in all, the leading indicators suggest that the basic trend of economic expansion will remain
moderate (Figure 6). However, in the first quarter of 2001 GDP growth has accelerated. In particular
private households have considerably raised their expenditures since real disposable incomes have
increased more rapidly than before following the tax cuts. In the further course of this year, however,
the fiscal stimulus will gradually fade. Then the weakening of economic activity implied by the less
favorable external environment will get the upper hand. The cooling down of economic activity in the
United States will take on its own lead to a reduced demand for European products. Moreover the
deliveries to other regions will increase at a slower pace than before. Economic expansion will be
especially dampened in Southeast Asia and in Latin America by the development in the United States.
How will the weakening of the world economy affect the euro area? We forecast that real GDP in
the United States will increase by 1.5 percent this year (Gern et al. 2001). This can be regarded more
or less as a soft landing. A recession in the United States is not probable, yet it constitutes a risk for
our forecast. Recently Euroframe (2001) investigated with the help of a macro-econometric model
how strongly the euro area would be affected by a stronger weakening in the United States in 2001.
The growth rate of real GDP in the euro area would be 0.6 percentage points lower than in the
baseline projection if real GDP in the United States turned out 1 percentage point lower than in the
baseline projection. This would be accompanied by a strong depreciation of the US dollar. According
to these; estimates even zero output growth in the United States this year would not entail a recession
in the euro area.
1
0 Apart from the Institute of World Economics (Kiel) the following European research institutes participate in Euroframe:
CPB (Netherlands), DIW (Berlin), ETLA (Finland), NIESR (United Kingdom), OFCE (France), PROMETEIA (Italy)
and WIFO (Austria). For additional information on this cooperation see: http://www.euro-frame.org.17
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Source: Eurostat (2001); own forecast.
Real GDP in Euroland will rise by 2.5 percent in 2001 on average, after 3.4 percent the year before.
The slowdown is due to weaker external demand as well as to a slightly slower increase in domestic
demand (Figure 7). After an acceleration at the beginning of this year resulting from tax cuts private
households will expand their consumption expenditure at a slower pace in the remainder of 2001.
Gross fixed capital formation will increase by less than last year until late summer. We expect a
slightly faster increase from this fall on when sales and profit expectations will improve in the wake
of the recovery in the United States. Exports will considerably lose momentum this year. This is not
only due to the cooling down of the world economy, but also to the appreciation of the euro. We
assume that the real effective exchange rate of the euro will increase by around 9 percent in the course
of this year.
In the course of next year economic activity will expand in line with potential output (Table 3).
Monetary and fiscal policy will neither dampen nor stimulate economic growth. Domestic demand
will increase at a pace comparable to this year. Admittedly private investment will rise somewhat
faster in the wake of the recovery in the world economy, but private consumption will increase slower
than this year on average. This is due to a deceleration in disposable income growth because tax
relieves for private households will not reach the order of this year by far. Also there will be no
impulse from foreign trade next year. The increase in exports will remain moderate as the
appreciation of the euro will unfold its full effect. All in all we expect that real GDP will increase by
2.4 percent in 2002 (Table 4).
The increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) will gradually weaken in the
course of the forecast horizon. We expect that the inflation rate will decelerate to below 2 percent in
the fall of 2001 from around 2.5 percent at the beginning of the year. This is due to the decline in
crude oil prices. We assume that the oil price will average approximately 25 US dollar per barrel this
year and next year. The core inflation rate will continue to accelerate during the first half of 2001, but18
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aBased on GDP in current prices and exchange rates of 1999. — Percentage change over previous year. —
 cHarmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). —
''Standardized unemployment rates according to OECD. —
 ePartly estimated. — 'Forecast. — SBased on the number of employees in 1999.
Source: ECB (2001); OECD (2001); own calculations and forecasts.
decrease slightly afterwards. This can be traced back to the fact that the monetary overhang that had
arisen in the last two years has already been translated into higher consumer prices. The tightening of
monetary policy last year contributed to a calming of monetary expansion. Thus, the risk of a per-
manent violation of the stability target has diminished. Due to the high level at the beginning of this
year the inflation rate will average 2.3 percent in 2001. Next year it will amount to 1.8 percent on
average.
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